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1.  Introduction 
 
Schneider (1997) showed that the success of a green tax reform depends crucially on a small 
slope of the wage curve of an efficiency wage model in which production occurs using a second 
factor E, energy or emissions. Scholz (1998) revealed that there is a second necessary condition 
that the marginal revenue of the wage income tax is negative. In this note we show that (i) these 
two conditions are not independent, but rather depend both on the slope of the wage curve; and 
(ii) if Schneider’s condition of a sufficiently flat wage curve is fulfilled, marginal revenue of 
wage income taxes must be negative. By implication, both the green tax reform and the sign of 
the marginal revenue of wage income taxes depend on the slope of the wage curve which allows 
to distinguish three cases of a tax reform: a) a double dividend for a very small slope of the wage 
curve (Schneider’s case); b) failure of unemployment reduction (Scholz’ case) for a very steep 
wage curve; c) failure of emission reduction for an intermediate case of a wage curve slope.  
 
2.  Old and new results of the model  
 
Scholz (1998) considers the reduced form of Schneider’s model using her definition of symbols 
and derives three essential results: 
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Here DET = {β u (1-τ ) θ L -εθ E - ετθ L}/s is the determinant of the reduced form of the model; α = τε  
-(1-τ )β u. With all parameters but DET and α  defined in a way that they are positive, Scholz shows 
that Schneider’s results not only require α  > 0 but also DET < 0. The latter condition implies that 
the marginal revenue of wage income taxes, the first of the three results, must be negative.  
  We show now, that the sign of DET also depends on the slope of the wage curve in a way 
that α  > 0 implies DET < 0, but not vice versa.  
From the definitions of DET and α  given above one can see that   
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for useful comments to Dieter Imboden, Hans Nutzinger, and to Kerstin Schneider also for 
providing the graphs, which I have modified only slightly. Responsibility is entirely mine.   
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From the right-hand sides of the inequalities one can see that the fraction of the inequality 
derived from DET is larger than the fraction of the inequality derived from α  because in the first 















u , implies DET > 0, α <0,  . 0 ˆ / ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ > > < G T u E  (Employment 
failure) 
 
An increase of the energy or emissions tax reduces energy use and emissions, but increases 















L E , implies DET < 0, α <0,  . 0 ˆ / ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ < < > G T u E  (Emission 
failure) 
 
The energy or emissions tax increases employment but also energy use. Marginal revenue of 




















This is the case of a flat wage curve. Unemployment and emissions are both reduced and a double 
dividend can be reaped. These results can be summarized as follows. 
 
Proposition: A sufficiently flat wage curve implies negative marginal revenue of wage income 
taxes and the conditions for a double dividend are not independent of each other. 
 
Corollary: Schneider’s condition α  > 0 implies the one revealed by Scholz, DET < 0, i.e., a 
negative marginal revenue of wage income taxes, but not vice versa.    
 
By implication, Schneider’s case is not weakened but rather we have the empirical question how 
flat the wage curves are. Authors providing support for a double dividend view tend to use 
horizontal labour supply or wage curve (besides Schneider 1997, see Nielsen et al. 1995 and 
Koskela et al. 2001). Otherwise the success of a green tax reform depends on having a labour cost 
reduction that does not benefit the unemployed or black market workers (Bovenberg and van der 
Ploeg 1998, Koskela and Schöb 1999). As in most countries institutional arrangements are such 
that the unemployed would also benefit from a labour tax reduction (see Koskela and Schöb 1999), either institutional change is required or this latter way does not work and the slope issue 
of the Schneider paper remains crucial.   
 
3.  Some ‘back –on-the-envelop’ empirics 
 
If a politician wants to know whether or not unemployment and emissions will increase or 
decrease after the introduction of an eco-tax (s)he needs to know the value of Beta relative to the 
other terms. This will be very difficult for two reasons.  
First, the wage curve replaces the textbook labour-supply curve in the model, which is 
structurally very similar. Labour supply curves are normally expected to be very steep. 
Bovenberg (1995) reports that an increase of wages by 1% increases labour supply by 0.02%. 
This is an almost vertical function, which comes very close to an exogenous labour supply.  If the 
wage curve replaces the labour-supply function, the question is whether or not empirical results 
can differ very much from those of a labour supply function. The structural equations, which have 
to be estimated for different models are always very similar to each other (see Pissarides 1998). 
This view would support the assumption of a very high value of Beta, which in turn would 
support the view that an eco-tax increases unemployment. On the other hand, this latter result of 
an increase in unemployment could be an optimum because it buys an improvement of the 
environment  (see Schneider 1997, section IV). One may doubt however, that voters and 
politicians have the individual welfare or utility function, which drives this policy result, because 
results based on questionnaires show a huge priority for employment (see Böhringer und Vogt 
2001). In sum, it is not surprising, that scientific support for a green tax reform has been based on 
models with fixed wages and the implied horizontal labour supply curve (see Nielsen et al. 1995 
and Koskela et al. 2001).
2  
Second, the term α  =  ε β ) / 1 1 ( / T T u − + −  must be positive. 1-1/T is the percentage tax rate 
on gross wages and 1/T is the percentage that remains after taxes. Graafland and Huizinga (1999) 
estimate an equation similar to a wage curve – derived from a bargaining model - and obtain a 
semi-elasticity (- ∂w/w/∂u) between 1.5 for the second half of the 1970s and 3.0 for the beginning 
of the 1990s. In order to make these values comparable with Beta, the semi-elasticity can be 
multiplied with the European unemployment rates of the corresponding time periods: the first 
number with the unemployment rate of about u=5% and the second with u=10%. This yields 
values for Beta of 0.075 and 0.3. The higher the unemployment rate is, the higher the elasticity. 
This method clearly differs from a constant elasticity approach. Each figure shows two surfaces. 
The  flat one is the benchmark-value of Beta as derived from the Graafland-Huizinga semi-
elasticities, assuming for illustrative purposes that they are more generally valid than just for the 
Netherlands. The bended curve shows values for the right-hand side of the inequality 
β β ≡ − − < ) 1 /( ) 1 ( u T u u  called ‘beta’ on the vertical axis of the graph, which are calculated for 
alternative values of the unemployment rate u and the tax factor t=1/T, which is the percentage of 
the gross wage, which the employee gets. The lower this percentage and the higher the rate of 
unemployment the larger is the right-hand side of the inequality. In the case of the higher 
elasticity β u = 0.3, the after-tax percentage, which the employee gets has to be fairly low (below 
40%) for all unemployment rates below 15% in order to get a double dividend. In the case of the 
lower elasticity β u=0.075, however, a large right-hand side is much more easy to get. Therefore 
one cannot derive a clear-cut answer to the question whether or not the wage curve is flat enough 
to guarantee a double dividend or predict increasing emissions or unemployment.    
 
 
                                                 
2 Other support has been based on bargaining models in which the revenues of a green tax reform are used 
to improve the situation of working people compared to those not working.  
4.  Conclusion 
 
We have shown that the condition of a flat wage curve as revealed by Schneider (1997) and the 
condition of negative marginal revenue of wage income taxes are not independent of each other. 
But rather a sufficiently steep (flat) wage curve implies positive (negative) marginal revenue of 
wage income taxes. The dismissal of negative marginal revenue of wage income taxes is 
premature unless one can prove that wage curves are not sufficiently flat. So far flat and steep 
curves are used in the literature. Our back-on-the-envelop calculations do not allow excluding any 
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High values of the unemployment rate and low values of the after-tax 
factor allow for a double dividend if the wage curve has an elasticity 



























































Only very high values of the unemployment rate and 
very low values of the after-tax factor allow for a 
double dividend if the wage curve has an elasticity 
of 0 3
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